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Abstract 
Given China‘s negligent environmental history and political battles regarding other issues, creating and 
disseminating a positive message surrounding the 2008 Olympic Games became a challenge for the Beijing 
Organizing Committee for the Olympics Games (BOCOG). This study explores material published by BOCOG 
on its official website and examines how environmental issues were framed in the process of bidding and 
preparations for the Beijing Olympiad. We find that BOCOG used different framing strategies for external and 
internal publics. The dominant master frame targeted at the external public could be considered a 
―gain-versus-loss‖ frame promoting acceptance of the Games. For internal publics, in addition to a 
gain-versus-loss frame, BOCOG also adopted ―identity and national pride‖ as master frames. 
Keywords: Beijing Olympics, environmental communication, framing 
1. Framing Environmental Issues in Biding and Preparations for the Beijing Olympic Games 
On August 8, 2008 the opening ceremonies for the Beijing Olympic Games initiated one of the most 
controversial Olympiads in modern history. Although the awarding of that Olympiad to the People‘s Republic of 
China (PRC) was long-overdue in some eyes, the bidding and planning processes were marred by controversy 
and difficulty. After a failed bid attempt in 1993 for the 2000 Games (GamesBids.com, 2009), Beijing officials 
brought an unbeatable offer to the table for the 2008 games and won the rights to host the Olympics for the first 
time in the country‘s history. Once the decision was announced on July 13, 2001 by International Olympic 
Committee (IOC), President Juan Antonia Samaranch, ―the city erupted into a party‖ (Ong, 2004, p. 35). 
Nonetheless, while the Chinese people were celebrating, Beijing Olympic officials were bracing for a difficult 
path, as many around the world did not support the PRC‘s victory. Critics argued that the PRC‘s human rights 
record, closed society, communist regime and environmental problems made it difficult to envision the Olympic 
ideals being realized in Beijing. 
As international sports become more prominent in the context of both popular culture and geopolitical intrigue, 
message campaigns managed by erstwhile host countries to promote their Olympic dreams have become 
important fodder for communication analysis. Cull (2008) argues that sport has become a powerful tool for 
international relationship-building and, in particular, the Games have come to be as much a political event as a 
sports spectacle (Kanin, 1981). In addition, Theodoraki (2009) observes that the manner in which Olympic 
organizing committees communicate their intentions and anticipates impacts of hosting the Games serves a vital 
branding function for not only any given Olympiad but also for the host country itself. And, in a world where 
environmental issues have taken the stage as a key component in a nation‘s attempt to participate in the global 
marketplace, events such as the Olympic Games can provide a useful venue for communication analysis in an 
international context. 
Although many facets of various Olympic bids warrant discussion, our intent is to specifically examine the 
environmental exigence that influenced Beijing‘s campaign. Following a brief overview of the PRC‘s 
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environmental and Olympic history, the bidding and planning process will be discussed in depth. Next, we 
provide an overview of the implicit frames that accompany campaigns directed at promoting the public face of 
events such as the Beijing Olympics. Finally, we will discuss how various message tactics were utilized by the 
Beijing Organizing Committee for the Olympics Games (BOCOG) to frame communications directed at both 
internal and external publics and how this helped the 2008 become the most successful Olympiad in terms 
national and international support and involvement. In the end, 10, 942 athletes from 204 countries participated 
in the Games (International Olympic Committee, 2009) and a Nielson study (2008) finds the Beijing Game 
attracted 4.7 billion viewers, which constituted 70 percent of the world‘s population.  
2. The PRC’s Environmental and Olympic History 
China is believed to have one of the oldest cultures in the world and ancient principles continue to buttress a 
collective code of ethics (City University of New York, 1995). Significantly, the religion of ancient China 
represented a form of nature worship wherein ―nature itself needed careful tending‖ (Berthrong, 2003, p. 376; cf. 
Elvin, 1998; Shinn, 2009). However, with a population boom in the late-Imperial age, resources were 
increasingly exploited beyond replacement rates and started becoming scarce. 
The PRC, created in 1949 under Chinese Communist Party leader Mao Zedong, focused primarily on economic 
development during the early decades of the Republic and the PRC‘s leadership believed that man could and 
should ―conquer nature‖ by adopting emergent Maoist ideals (Liu & Diamond, 2005; Shapiro, 2001). In the 
1950s, production of industrial goods skyrocketed while the agricultural sector plummeted as peasants were 
forced off land and into factories (Sanders, 1999). A constant emphasis on economic expansion ruled the day as 
decentralization occurred, in turn spurring on economic growth beyond metropolitan areas (Shildo, 1990). In 
short, environmentally benign, sustainable natural resource policy took a backseat to industrialization. Mao‘s 
leadership throughout the 1950s and 1960s led to not only environmental neglect, but also significant 
degradation of natural resources. Whatever meager attempts were made to protect the natural environment were 
largely thwarted by a widespread lack of authority in the countryside and little coordination between existing 
environmental agencies (Jahiel, 1998).  
As the PRC became a major exporter of goods during mid-Twentieth Century, environmental dilapidation 
became a cause for concern among importing nations. In response, the Chinese Cultural Revolution began 
making significant strides by the early 1970‘s and the concept of environmental protection was rejuvenated and 
widely supported. Yet progress was spotty and the environment continued to degrade. After Mao‘s death, Deng 
Xiaoping assumed power and began implementing a very different agenda including privatized farming, light 
industry and agriculture, and price-based agriculture (Sanders, 1999). The central government essentially 
maintained absolute power through the promulgation of five-year plans that proved to be a foundation of for 
ushering China into an increasingly competitive position among industrialized nations. 
Despite the somewhat iron-grip of economic authoritarianism in mainland China, the Deng regime also included 
the first Environmental Protection Law for the PRC in 1989, which later became ―fundamental state policy‖ 
(Edmonds, 1994, p. 71). The following decade was highlighted by the inception of the Ministry of Urban and 
Rural Construction and Environmental Protection which was later changed to the National Environmental 
Protection Agency (NEPA). Coincidentally, the PRC government began to see the need to cultivate a more 
positive international reputation so as to assert regional and global influence (Kurlantzick, 2006), and one avenue 
to such esteem was thought to be found in the Olympic movement (cf. Manheim, 1990). 
As one of the most powerful countries in the world, dominance on the playing field came naturally to the 
Chinese people. China‘s first involvement with the modern Olympic movement came in 1899 when modern 
Olympic founder Pierre de Coubertin invited Chinese athletes through Qing Dynasty rulers to the 1896 Games in 
Athens. Although the Qing government declined the invitation due to their unfamiliarity with organized sports 
events, the Olympics were included in national media coverage for the next three decades. In 1931, the IOC 
bestowed recognition upon the All-China Athletic Association whereupon China finally began sending 
delegations to the Games (Chinese Olympic Committee, 2008). The PRC‘s breakout Olympic year did not come 
until the 1984 Los Angeles Games in which 224 athletes competed and brought home fifteen gold, eight silver 
and nine bronze medals finishing fourth in the overall medal standings (Chinese Olympic Committee, 2008). 
Hosting an Olympic Games was the next logical step. China had become the world‘s most populous country and 
the fourth largest in area. Its economy was also currently growing at the fastest rate of any major nation. 
Nonetheless, its environmental problems were also the most severe in the world and worsening (Liu & Diamond, 
2005). Such were the issues that had to be addressed as Beijing prepared to bid to showcase a modern Olympiad. 
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3. Bidding for the Olympic Games 
Beijing initially bid for the rights to host the Olympic Games in 1993 but was unsuccessful as the rights to host 
the 2000 Games awarded to Sydney, Australia. Concurrently, the PRC was a budding Olympic powerhouse and 
was increasingly competitive on the world sports stage. It was also at this time that the PRC was involved in 
international debates involving environmental degradation and human rights violations, thereby casting a pall 
over Beijing‘s bid. Adopting the lead set in 1994 at the Lillehammer Games, the 1998 Olympiad in Nagano, 
Japan marked the first time the IOC adopted a formal protocol for applicant countries to follow regarding 
environmental issues (Cantelon & Letters, 2000). One of the pillars of Sydney‘s winning Olympic bid was a 
focus upon the idea of sustainable development giving it the cutting edge over Beijing by incorporating the 
newest Olympic ideal. As Beyer (2006) notes and the IOC reiterated in the revised version of the Olympic 
Charter, the Olympics is more than merely an athletic competition. Recognizing the importance of the 
environment and sustainable development, the IOC in 1996, added an important element regarding 
environmental protection to the Olympic Charter: ―The IOC‘s role with respect to the environment is: to 
encourage and support a responsible concern for environmental issues, to promote sustainable development in 
sport and to require that the Olympic Games are held accordingly‖ (Olympic Charter, 1996, Chapter 1, Rule 2). 
As host for the 2000 Games, Sydney‘s environmental strategies included public transport access, solar power 
applications, green building material selection, recycling of construction waste, energy and water conservation, 
and wetland restoration. Athens, the host of 2004 Olympiad, adopted eco-friendly vehicles and eco-friendly 
building materials aw well, used new energy technology, and planted over 12 million small trees and bushes 
throughout the Greek capital (IOC, 2009). Thus, in addition to showing the IOC that China was well-positioned 
to highlight its culture while guaranteeing successful Games per se, Beijing also had to be committed to an 
environmentally benign event in hosting the games. 
However, before a city can bid to host an Olympic Games, it must first be named as a candidate. It was not until 
November 1998 that China‘s Central Committee formally decided to offer Beijing as a candidate for the 2008 
Olympics. A formal application from the Beijing government entered the city into the running to become a 
candidate city. The IOC accepted Beijing as a candidate city later that month and Beijing officials immediately 
started to prepare a new bid (Ong, 2004). The Beijing 2008 Olympic Games Bid Committee (BOBICO) was 
officially created in September 1999 (BOCOG, 2002) and the organization spent the next two years to bring the 
Olympics to the PRC for the very first time. 
While Beijing was bidding for the Olympic Games, China made several promises to the IOC regarding 
improvements to the local environment, among other things protecting the health of Olympic athletes from the 
ambient air pollution prominent in Beijing. These promises were made to strengthen Beijing‘s bid for the 
Olympics and gain support throughout voting members of the IOC as well as the international sporting 
community. In that the bid was a first step in Beijing realizing its Olympic quest, it became an integral part in 
socially constructing the Games to demonstrate the central government‘s renewed concern for the environment, 
as well as towards sustainable green development throughout the country in the future. 
The new bid worked to address concerns voiced by the IOC during the 1993 attempt, in particular environmental 
degradation in China and the potential for harm those conditions had for the Olympic Games per se. This time, 
to the extent the environmental impact of the Games had been a growing concern among citizens and in the 
international community, Beijing demonstrably embraced the new Olympic ―green‖ ideal in its second bid with 
significant consideration taken regarding the environment. BOCOG used its bid for the 2008 Games to address 
many of these ideals and to gain support amongst citizens, appropriating significant funding to issues such as air 
pollution from industry, construction and transportation (GamesBids.com, 2009). For example, environmental 
promises encompassed an increase in standards such as vehicle emissions, clean fuels in 90 percent of public 
busses and 70 percent of taxis, increasing the wastewater treatment capacity, constructing hazardous waste 
disposal systems and the relocation of more than 200 industrial enterprises (United Nations Environment 
Programme, 2007). Additionally, the equivalent of $12.2 (US) billion was allocated for environmental projects 
over nine years (BOCOG, 2002) making Beijing‘s environmental budget the largest in Olympic history. Along 
the way, the PRC leadership ramped-up their public rhetoric to advertise the setting of such an ambitious 
environmental agenda. As a result, BOCOG‘s environmental projects earned credibility and respect among 
athletes, countries and environmental organizations (Economy, 2007). Indeed, more than a year before the 
opening ceremonies, the Beijing government was extolling the virtues of its green-planning process by declaring 
that all of the environmental promises made in the 2001 bid had been met by the end of 2007 (Yuan, 2008). 
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Many viewed Beijing‘s win as inevitable due to the PRC‘s world economic power and growing Olympic 
dominance. However, The Olympic Games also presented the PRC with the opportunity to simultaneously 
address international concerns on a variety of fronts. In that this was also the first formal public communication 
BOBICO had regarding the environment, a focus upon sustainability meant that the message appeal had to be 
shaped from the beginning in a very specific way. As such, environmental foci became driving elements in the 
framing of the Games to the world at large. 
4. Frames, Communication and the Seduction of Publics 
One approach to understanding the extent to which the bidding process for the Beijing Olympiad was 
strategically constructed to deal with the environmental exigence of on-the-ground conditions in the PRC 
focuses on the role played by the project‘s strategic framing given the culture and cognitions of both the Chinese 
people and the international audience. Gray (2003) defines framing as ―the process of constructing and 
representing our interpretations of the world around us through a construction of categories based on our 
experiences relative to previous interpretations‖ (p. 12). Entman (1993) states that ―to frame is to select some 
aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to 
promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and /or treatment 
recommendation of the item described‖ (p. 52). For Entman, frames have various functions including 
defining problems, diagnosing causes, making moral judgments, and suggesting remedies. 
For mega-events like Olympic Games, Zaharospulous (2007) notes that media framing is, arguably, the most 
important concern in the public sphere. In a sense, ―the Olympics are and were whatever the media portrayed 
them to be‖ (p. 239). When examining the media frame of 2004 Olympic Games in Greek, Zaharospulous 
observed that how the 2004 Olympic Games were framed ―tell[s] us about journalistic decisions, values, and 
practices‖ (p. 237) and also can ―point to potential effects of such practices‖ (p. 237, cf. Billings and Eastman, 
2003). 
Variants on the framing theme can be considered as two sides of the very same coin. One perspective presents 
frames as theoretical, mental constructions used to interpret, among other stimuli, communication in the public 
sphere (e.g., Gross & D'Ambrosio, 2004). The alternate perspective holds that frames are embedded in the 
structure of instrumental discourse and serve to organize narratives in coherent ways (e.g., Schlechtweg, 1996). 
At the intersection of cognitive and narrative framing lies the interpretive landscape of meaning and the extent to 
which the targets of advocacy more-or-less resonate with the arguments and portrayals agents produce. Here, the 
choices agents make in framing issues for public consumption is of the utmost importance when promoting 
projects in the competitive marketplace of ideas. That is, as an agent consciously or tacitly selects and uses a 
dominant frame when casting arguments in the public sphere, the quintessential objective must be to have the 
target population interpret the message using that particular frame as an organizing scheme (Davis & Lewicki, 
2003; Pinker, 2007). 
As a theoretical concept, the idea of a ―frame‖ has enjoyed wide application in a variety of research traditions. 
The concept is well-entrenched in fields such as psychology (e.g., Galotti, 2009), argumentation, (e.g., Hample, 
Werber, & Young, 2009), persuasion (e.g., Henningsen, et al., 2003), psycholinguistics (Lakoff, 2004), and 
political science (e.g., Beer & De Landtsheer, 2004); it has also found a home in a variety of applied domains 
such as health communication (e.g., Reinhart, et al., 2007), conflict management (e.g., Brummans, et al., 2008), 
and social movement dynamics (Dardis, 2007). In particular, approaching frames from either a narrative or 
cognitive vantage has enjoyed a good deal interest by environmental communication scholars focusing on media 
studies (e.g., Shanahan & McComas, 1999), public participation (e.g., Davis & Lewicki, 2003), watershed 
management (e.g., Dewulf, et al., 2007), and environmental risk analysis (e.g., Leiserowitz, 2005). Clearly, as an 
analytic construct, framing has enjoyed considerable attention, suggesting it‘s applicability to the BOCOG‘s 
campaign to host the Olympics and manage public perceptions of the event as time went along. 
One of the central elements in the framing of narratives and subsequent frame-bound interpretations thereof is 
the presence of ―master frames‖ that organize and appeal or depiction around one or more dominant themes 
(Lakoff, 2004). For example, an ―environmental justice‖ frame provides a trope for both the advocacy against 
and the interpretation of discourse related to environmental degradation to extend beyond humans harming their 
environment to humans, in doing so, harming other humans (cf. Bullard, 1993; Pezzullo, 2001). In addition, 
Hunt, Benford, and Snow‘s (1994) analysis suggests that master frames may gain a good deal of their perceptual 
influence to the extent they are linked to the self-concepts of a target group or their group identity. And the 
association need not be a conscious act on the part of either narrative agent or the receptive mind, though it 
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would hardly be considered a strategic rhetorical move if the disseminating party were not well aware of framing 
decisions implicit in any advocacy campaign. 
Traditional analyses of public outreach campaigns associated with the Olympic Games have focused on the 
marketing of such events to provide host cities and nations with a ―branding‖ that commences with the opening 
ceremonies for each biennial event. For example, in the case of the Beijing Olympiad, Bu (2009) contends that 
brand value focused on images of ―harmony‖ and ―green‖ approaches to the Games. In contrast, we believe the 
overall image of the Beijing Olympics was the cumulative and strategic product of how the Games were framed 
in the years leading up to 2008. 
5. Framing the Beijing Olympics 
Because of a blemished environmental and social history, gaining support for the Beijing Olympics in the 
international arena, even after the city won the rights to host the Olympiad, was a major undertaking. Most 
importantly, BOCOG had to constantly communicate at home and abroad about the planning process, new 
policies and procedures, and goals for the Games. Such information had to be framed to present a precise 
message to the public in an attempt to gain support, specifically for the environmental plans and policies relevant 
to the 29th Summer Olympiad in the modern era (Brewer & Gross, 2005). 
With the environment as a cornerstone of Beijing‘s successful Olympic bid, work had to continue throughout the 
planning process to achieve the tangible goals of the Games. With so much at stake, BOCOG continued 
campaigning worldwide. Although the Games were widely supported during the bidding process, there were still 
more than a few skeptics. Because of the opposition, BOCOG had to develop the prospect for the Games and its 
image to garner support from both internal and external publics. BOCOG understood that to control response 
and reaction, they had to control the message (Bu, 2009). In particular, the PRC government had to manage the 
impressions of the international, external public first and foremost; given the collectivist culture and 
authoritarian strictures on the Chinese mainland, impression management directed at the internal homeland 
public was of secondary importance. Nonetheless, each of these two, distinct publics reflected unique constraints 
regarding how the environmental problems occasioned by the Games should be addressed, therefore requiring 
the Beijing government to employ a pair of dominant and recessive master frames in the BOCOG campaign. 
6. Framing for an External Public 
The external public BOCOG faced consisted primarily of other Olympic-team countries. However, the external 
public also includes international environmental organizations, national Olympic committees and concerned 
governments. These groups were concerned for athletes‘ ease at the Olympic experience, exposure to pollution 
from transportation and other sources, and long-term health effects after the Games among other environmental 
issues. For the external publics, messages detailed improvements to air quality, green construction practices, 
water system improvements and transportation system expansion. The dominant master frame for these 
messages could be considered a gain-versus-loss frame promoting acceptance of the Games. 
The gain-versus-loss master frame prompts action more to prevent a loss than to capture a gain (cf. Gerend & 
Shepherd, 2007; Shmueli, Elliott, & Kaufman, 2006) and, in many respects, is similar to individuals‘ and 
nations‘ tendencies to minimize their losses while maximizing their gains, or the ―minimax principle‖ (Hood, 
2002; Schlenker, 1980). Although this idea is commonly understood in the Chinese culture, internationally it is 
not an accepted ideal everywhere. Employing this master frame allowed BOCOG to communicate with others 
around the globe that the PRC was concerned for the international athletes and without their support and 
assistance the Olympics would not be as healthy or environmentally friendly as possible. In the case of the 
Beijing Olympics, the loss was to be found in potential problems for athletes attending the games; the gain being 
a healthier, cleaner environment during and following the Beijing Olympics. It was important in this instance to 
appeal to the international audience‘s personal gain or loss and to demonstrate that the loss was imminent 
without support and the gain was vital for a successful Olympiad to come about. 
The gain-versus-loss master frame appealed to the international desire for a strong stance toward environmental 
standards, resulting in a safe and healthy Olympics, and thereby gaining support for the PRC‘s efforts to create a 
―green‖ Olympics. In discourse, it emphasized the traditional Taoist idea that all gain requires loss of 
opportunity, at least to some extent. For example, in 2005 BOCOG released a ―Road to 2008: Environmental 
Themes and Guidelines‖ discussing the prevention and control of air pollution, water treatment, solid waste 
management and more (BOCOG, 2006). More importantly, the information contained pertained directly to 
international audiences and the direct investment China was contributing in the name of the environment. 
Beijing boasted the involvement of its people and the large strides made toward ―Green Olympics‖. These 
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messages highlighted the positive effects of the green efforts toward improving Beijing‘s environment, thereby 
eliciting a positive response from the international community. 
The ―Green Olympics‖ concept also highlighted the gain-versus-loss master frame as BOCOG regularly used it 
to link the PRC to environmentalism in general. BOCOG‘s desired response from the message was public 
support from other national Olympic committees and minimal international opposition before and during the 
Games. One of the most important and influential pieces of communication in this regard was the Beijing 
Olympic Action Plan (BOAP). The BOAP discussed explicit plans made by BOCOG in conjunction with 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and national Olympic governing bodies regarding many aspects of the 
Beijing Games with a specific section focusing on the environment. The BOAP was meant to inform them about 
plans to regulate pollutants and overall improve the environment for not only the Beijing Olympic Games but the 
future as well. The BOAP discussed several areas of environmental concern that would be addressed and 
improved during the Olympic planning process. The gain-versus-loss message framing communicated to the 
world that without support nationally and internationally, Beijing could not host the Green Olympics BOCOG 
had promised in securing the Games.  
Examples of this frame can be found in the BOAP. The Green Olympic Action plan is a subset of the BOAP and 
was signed by the BOCOG, municipal authorities, and numerous NGOs. The plan utilizes the master framing 
throughout its entire length. For instance, ―The concept of Green Olympics becomes more and more popular 
among Beijing Citizens… and a solid foundation has been laid for the strategy of the Green Olympics…‖ 
(BOCOG, 2003). The plan goes on to state, ―[it] gives full consideration to present status with first priority given 
to meeting the demands of the people‖ (BOCOG, 2003). Focusing on the people and providing guidelines to 
green living such as ―solid wastes should be reused or recycling and all the hazardous wastes should be safely 
treated and disposed… it will also be encouraged to use cleaner energy to replace coal-burning…give priority to 
public transportation and rail transportation‖ (BOCOG, 2003). Although these are measures taken by the people 
in Beijing, the effects of these improvements appeal to international audiences. Indeed, though the PRC had a 
good deal to gain from the Games per se, external publics were less concerned with the PRC‘s outcome than for 
any outcome affecting themselves. For example, The China Daily conducted a survey in 26 countries and 
regions about their interest in tourism in China. Forty-five percent of 26, 000 people polled expressed their 
intention to travel to China after seeing the opening ceremony and 51 percent showed their interest after seeing 
the closing ceremony (China Daily, 2008). In a gain-versus-loss framework, the international community came 
to understand that the achievement of their gains, as well as the avoidance of and loss, depended on the PRC 
creating a Green Olympics that benefited its people and avoided the loss of national prestige in and out of the 
sporting arena. 
7. Framing for an Internal Public 
Internally, the Chinese people were concerned about the cost of environmental improvement, potential 
displacement and pollution as a result of Olympic construction, and the delivery of promised long-term 
environmental benefits. In turn, BOCOG primarily utilized a secondary identity master frame to communicate 
with the residents of Beijing and beyond so as to appeal to their strong sense of national pride. The PRC has a 
long cultural history that many of its citizens strongly identify with. Appealing to the cultural identity of the 
citizens helped recruit support for the games, solicit volunteers and simply promote the event throughout the 
country. To address some of the concerns voiced nationwide, BOCOG utilized the Beijing Municipal 
Government as it is responsible for matters related to environmental and natural resource management 
encompassing all Beijing based Olympic venues and activities (BOCOG, 2002). Empowering the local 
government to oversee Olympic planning effectively decentralized the decision making process, giving more 
power to citizens to participate in the shape of the Olympiad. This also appealed to citizen‘s strong sense of 
identity. Communications discussing this matter were framed in a way that allowed the internal public for the 
Games to personify the ostensible nationalistic fervor for environmental protection. 
The identity master frame can be seen in communications such as a news article on China‘s official website: 
―‗The Games gave us a more open and mature attitude,‘ said Professor Hu Jiqing from Nanjing University. ‗This 
attitude featured magnanimity, tolerance and pluralism. More importantly, it embodies a more confident nation‘‖ 
(Xinhua News Agency, 2008). Such demonstrates the effectiveness of the master identity frame in nurturing the 
strong association the Chinese people have with their country. Finally, BOCOG developed several initiatives to 
spread the message of environmental values among the public including ―The Green Community‖ and ―Green 
Home Campaign,‖ the ―One Day, No Engine Sounds‖ Campaign, ―The Beijing Green Map Initiative,‖ and the 
―Close to the Nature Hand in Hand with Fuwa‖ exhibition. Each of these communications demonstrated what 
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individuals and communities could do to improve the environment, making the issue salient and personal 
(United Nations Environment Programme, 2007; cf. Kraft & Wurtz, 1996). 
Additionally, the dominant gain-versus-loss master frame also assisted BOCOG in maintaining support 
internally as national pride was wed to international prestige. As each goal in the planning process was reached, 
news media assisted in spreading the positive message and reinforced the idea that the Games were gaining a 
benefit for the country and its people. As a result of national support and assistance, many of Beijing‘s bid 
commitments were made ahead of schedule, and green initiatives began early and lasted longer with stronger 
effects throughout the process (United Nations Environment Programme, 2007). 
The melding of the gain-versus-loss master frame with the identity master frame was also used to promote a 
future sense of identity for the Chinese people. This tactic was directed more towards children through the use of 
the five Olympic mascots promoting environmental awareness.  
Fuwa, the official mascots also carried a message of Chinese national identity, as well as Beijing‘s Commitment 
to an environment-friendly Game. Fuwa, literally in Chinese, meant lucky kids. Four of five Fuwa respectively 
represented four of China‘s most popular animals – fish, panda, Tibetan antelope, and swallow. The last one 
represented the Olympic Flame. Five Fuwa also embody the five fundamental natural elements in Chinese 
culture: metal, wood, water, fire, and earth. The mission of Fuwa was to convey friendship, prosperity and peace 
to the world. Beibei, the Fuwa of fish and water symbolized prosperity and harvest. Jingjing, the Fuwa of panda 
with a headdress of lotus, was the symbol of the lush forest and the harmonious relationship between human and 
nature. Huanhuan, the Fuwa of fire, represented the Olympic sprite, and the enthusiastic characteristics of 
Chinese people. Yingying, the one of Tibetan antelope, was a symbol of the vastness of China‘s landscape. Also, 
the selection of the Tibetan Antelope reflected Beijing‘s commitment to a Green Olympics. Nini, the Fuwa of a 
golden-winged swallow, symbolized the infinite sky and spread good luck wherever she flew. The names of five 
Fuwa, when putting together, form ―Beijing Huanying Ni‖, which means ―Welcome to Beijing.‖ To sum up, the 
use of Fuwa as the official mascots of the Game in Beijing expressed Chinese people‘s pride of their country and 
Chinese people‘s desire to reach out to the world through the Game In addition, he pervasive use of Fuwa across 
the country demonstrated the effect of green living on the environment over time and enforced the idea that the 
environment needed help to sustain the national identity (United Nations Environment Programme, 2007). 
8. Conclusion 
The IOC placed immense faith in the Beijing bidding committee to host a peaceful, clean and competitive 
Olympics. Lofty promises were made during the bidding phase, and the PRC was thrust front and center to reach 
and exceed those goals on the way to hosting the largest Olympic Games in history. As a result, the PRC was 
also well on its way to making the country more of an environmentally friendly place. With the international 
spotlight on the entire country, internal and external publics became major factors during the planning process. 
With years of planning needed to create the Olympic Games, maintaining support throughout the process 
became vital to success. Due to the PRC‘s poor environmental history in addition to political battles regarding 
other issues, creating and disseminating a positive message surrounding the Games became a challenge for 
BOCOG. Using framing to shape the messages disseminated to the public allowed BOCOG to predict and shape 
the public‘s reaction. The gain-versus-loss frame enticed international support by showing each country what it 
stood to gain from a healthy Games supported world-wide versus what could potentially be lost by each country 
if the Games took place in a polluted, congested and unhealthy setting. Identity frames utilized nationwide by 
BOCOG and national media alike appealed to each person‘s sense of self to assist in gaining support. 
Most communications sent out by BOCOG had explicit intentions. In the case of the Beijing Olympics, the PRC 
knew the event was a milestone in history and treated it as such. Communicating with each public was crucial, 
specifically regarding environmental activities. Once aspects of the ongoing campaign were pitched and received, 
master frames that were compatible with the social and cultural selves of those in and out of the PRC were used 
as interpretative screens for the information provided in order to more easily understand it with reference to their 
own experiences. BOCOG utilized this innate response to elicit a particular response from the publics receiving 
communication based on new information with respect to previous information. 
Although the PRC was largely successful in managing its public face leading up to the 2008 Olympiad, we 
cannot conclude our analysis without recognizing that the reality of life on the ground during and after the 
Games did not necessarily match the BOCOG hype. As Economy (2007) observed even before the Games 
commenced, there was a darker underbelly to what the national and international audience saw: 
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Since Beijing promised in 2001 to hold a "green Olympics" in 2008, the International Olympic Committee has 
pulled out all the stops. Beijing is now ringed with rows of newly planted trees, hybrid taxis and buses are 
roaming its streets (some of which are soon to be lined with solar-powered lamps), the most heavily polluting 
factories have been pushed outside the city limits, and the Olympic dormitories are models of energy efficiency. 
Yet in key respects, Beijing has failed to deliver. City officials are backtracking from their pledge to provide safe 
tap water to all of Beijing for the Olympics; they now say that they will provide it only for residents of the 
Olympic Village. They have announced drastic stopgap measures for the duration of the games, such as banning 
one million of the city's three million cars from the city's streets and halting production at factories in and around 
Beijing (some of them are resisting). Whatever progress city authorities have managed over the past six years -- 
such as increasing the number of days per year that the city's air is deemed to be clean -- is not enough to ensure 
that the air will be clean for the Olympic Games. Preparing for the Olympics has come to symbolize the 
intractability of China's environmental challenges and the limits of Beijing's approach to addressing them (p. 46). 
Nonetheless, the PRC was quite effective in managing the impressions of the international community by getting 
the external public to focus on what Beijing was doing to minimize environmental problems in order to 
maximize the benefits the Games would incur. Rhetorically, the master framing of the campaign also mobilized 
the Chinese people behind the green banner of the Olympiad‘s public face. And, in the end, scholars of 
environmental communication have been left with a fine example of a government‘s skillful use of narrative and 
psychology in the discourse of the public sphere. 
9. Limitations 
This project primarily adopts qualitative approaches to analyze how the PRC frames the environmental issues 
when applying for the host of 2008 Olympic Games. The in-depth analysis yields insightful and convincing 
findings. Arguably however, to adopt the mixed method which also involves quantitative approaches will make 
this project more methodological sound and provide a more comprehensive test of our research questions, and 
consequently to make the findings more generalizable about how the national governments‘ framing of the 
specific issues when applying for host major sports events will work.  
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